Volume 65, Issue 2, 501-551
Open almost any news source, or simply turn on the program guide of any television, and the explosive proliferation of sports telecasts is quickly evident. The amount that exhibitors pay to sports leagues has reached dizzying heights, due in large part to high demand and the unique, unrecorded nature of sports telecasts. These desirable characteristics arguably make sports telecast contracts essential to the economic viability and competitiveness of leagues and telecasters alike. Although these contracts provide many benefits cheap jerseys from China to corporations and leagues, embedded within them are weighty restrictions such as “black out” rules and exclusive distributorships. These restrictions raise questions as to the ultimate op effect that such contracts wholesale mlb jerseys have on competition and Paul’s overall consumer welfare. The two legal mechanisms that traditionally protect industry- wide competition and consumer welfare are antitrust law and regulation. This is no less true in the professional sports and the telecast industries. The collision of these two industries has resulted in a labyrinth of regulation and uneven antitrust enforcement that diminishes consumer choice, program diversity, and cheap nfl jerseys competition.This Article presents a novel quantitative analysis of sports league antitrust jurisprudence to counter cries for increased regulatory scrutiny of these joint ventures. The results demonstrate that antitrust is not only capable of policing joint ventures, but that the cheap nba jerseys Supreme Court revitalized such review in American Needle v. NFL. Based on empirical review of past case law, current antitrust exemptions, and relevant regulatory policy, this Article presents several recommendations to both (1) rationalize regulatory rules that currently Congress create disparate treatment among Lopifit: leagues and telecasters, Secretary and (2) clear the field for pro-consumer competition in sports telecasts.